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Jonathan G.S. Koppell
Yale University

Hybrid Organizations and the Alignment
of Interests: The Case of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac
This article explores the political influence of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). Using
Congress's overhaul of the regulatory infrastructure for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as a case
study, the article presents two principal findings: (1) The characteristics that distinguish government-sponsored enterprises from traditional government agencies and private companies endow

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with unique political resources; and (2) the alignment of interest
groups around Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is subject to strategic manipulation by the GSEs. A
triangular model of this alignment is proposed and employed to analyze the legislative outcome.
The case has implications for students of organizational theory as well as policy makers considering the use of GSEs or other hybrid organizations.

Although their names suggest Southern folksiness,

connaissance, an effort to understand the dynamics surrounding a particular type of hybrid.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are recognized in Washing-

ton for their political clout, not their down-home cooking.

* Specify the interaction of organizational structure and

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, known formally as the Fed-

political influence. David Truman observes that "Al-

eral National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home

though the effect of structural arrangements is not al-

Loan Mortgage Corporation, respectively, are government-

ways what its designers intended, these formalities are

sponsored enterprises (GSEs)-stockholder-owned, profit-

rarely neutral" (1993, 322). It should not be surprising

seeking corporations created by Congress to help address

that the characteristics distinguishing government-spon-

America's housing needs. GSEs are one type of hybrid

sored enterprises from private corporations and govern-

organization that combines characteristics of public- and

ment agencies should distinguish the nature of their po-

private-sector entities.

litical influence as well.

Although they are increasingly popular at the local, state,

Federal regulators recently unveiled proposed regula-

and national levels of government, hybrids receive rela-

tions intended to ensure the financial safety and sound-

tively little attention. This article considers the political

ness of the two GSEs and to set levels of performance for

influence of GSEs through an examination of congressional

low-income borrowers. Thus it is a timely moment to re-

crafting of legislation in 1992 to reshape the regulatory

visit legislation calling for the regulatory overhaul. The

oversight of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Specifically,

legislative history presented in this article was constructed

this article has two objectives:

from official records, trade magazines and newspapers, and

* Provide better understanding of GSEs. "While called
'private,"' observes Harold Seidman, who coined the
term government-sponsored enterprise, "these enter-

Jonathan G.S. Koppell is an assistant professor of politics, policy, and organization at the Yale School of Management. His research concerns the impli-

prises really function in a terra incognita, somewhere

cations of delegating public policy responsibilities to different types of hybrid

between the public and private sectors" (1988, 23). While
some have suggested frameworks for considering the
gamut of hybrid organizations (see Perry and Rainey
1988), this article takes the opposite tack: It is field re-

organizations including government-sponsored enterprises, governmentbacked venture capital funds, and government corporations. He was on the
staff of the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight from 1993 to
1995. Professor Koppell's article was accepted in the fall of 1999. Conse-

quently, it relies on sources and events prior to 2000. Email: jonathan.
koppell@yale.edu.
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extensive background interviews with participants from all

Thus, the federal government not only assumed the de-

sides including multiple executive agencies, Fannie Mae,

fault risk on these loans, it created a secondary mortgage

Freddie Mac, interest groups, congressional staff, and other

market, a place for lenders to sell loans, thereby increas-

interested parties. I

ing the supply of money for more loans. Fannie Mae was
gradually sold to private owners, and in 1968 it was char-

What Are Government-Sponsored
Enterprises?
Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) are hybrids-part public, part private-that affect the lives of
most Americans. Anyone who has borrowed money to

tered as a shareholder-owned corporation (R. Moe 1983),
moving its expenditures "off budget." At the same time,
the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie
Mae) was created as a government corporation to handle
unprofitable subsidization programs.
In 1970, Congress created the Federal Home Loan

purchase a home, farm, or pay for college, or invested in

Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) to purchase loans

a mutual fund has likely been touched by government-

made by institutions that were part of the Federal Home

sponsored enterprises.2 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are

Loan Bank System (another Depression-era entity cre-

public in several respects. Created by Congress to serve

ated to channel credit to home buyers). When the savings

public purposes, they are exempt from state and local

and loan (S&L) crisis precipitated the restructuring of

taxes, exempt from registration requirements of the Se-

the savings industry in 1989, Congress transformed

curities and Exchange Commission, and have a $2.25

Freddie Mac from a government corporation into a GSE

billion line of credit with the United States Treasury.3 They

modeled on Fannie Mae.

are not, however, subject to regulations that govern the

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are considerably further

activities of federal agencies. Their staffs are not consid-

removed from the federal government than other federal
housing entities. The Federal Home Loan Bank System is

ered government employees.

On the private side, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are

overseen by a board comprising five presidential appoin-

profitable businesses owned by private shareholders. Their

tees. The president of Ginnie Mae and the commissioner

combined net income in 1998 was over $5 billion (OFHEO

of the FHA are appointed by the president and answer to

1997). In terms of assets, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac rank

the secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban

third and sixth, respectively, among American corporations

Development (HUD). The president and officers of both

(Fortune 1999). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stock, traded

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in contrast, are selected by

on the New York Stock Exchange, consistently outperforms

the boards of directors. Their management answers to the

the S&P 500 average. Their executives earn multimillion-

board, not to the United States government. Although the

dollar salaries comparable to their Fortune 500 peers.

president of the United States appoints five of 18 board

Although there is no direct cost to the federal govern-

members, these directors are not distinguished from the

ment, GSEs do present financial risk. Despite explicit dis-

other members by an obligation to represent the president

claimers to the contrary, investors believe that the federal

or the administration (Musolf 1983).

government stands behind the GSEs' outstanding obliga-

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do not lend money or in-

tions. Because this perception has not been discouraged,

sure individual mortgages, but they do act as conduits. They

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securities have the implicit

purchase loans originated by private institutions (banks,

backing of the U.S. government.

thrifts, and mortgage bankers), giving lenders money to
make additional loans or investments. Fannie Mae or

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: A Primer
When Congress created the Federal Housing Adminis-

Freddie Mac keep the monthly payments made by the bor-

rower, or they bundle many loans together and resell shares
of the monthly payments as "mortgage-backed securities."6

tration (FHA) in 1934 to insure lenders against borrower

Securities sold by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are free of

default, it was expected that private associations would

credit risk; that is, even if home buyers default on their

purchase the mortgages as investments. No such associa-

loans, Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac will pay the holders of

tions ever materialized, so in 1938 an office was created

the mortgage securities all the money to which they are

within the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to fill the

entitled (See figure 1).

role (Fish 1979).4 This office, eventually named the Fed-

The most significant business advantage that Fannie Mae

eral National Mortgage Association (later dubbed "Fannie

and Freddie Mac enjoy (by virtue of their GSE status) is

Mae"), purchased FHA-insured loans from private lend-

relatively low borrowing costs. Because of the implicit fed-

ers. Fannie Mae also purchased federally guaranteed loans

eral guarantee, the companies borrow at interest rates only

to World War II veterans.5 The great suburban expansion

slightly higher than those paid by the U.S. Treasury. Even

of the 1950s was fueled by such loans (Jackson 1985).

companies rated as "AAA" by corporate rating firms pay
Hybrid Organizations and the Alignment of Interests 469
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higher interest rates on debt securities than Fannie Mae or

sector characteristics that give Fannie Mae and Freddie

Freddie Mac (R. Moe 1983). The prices of their mortgage

Mac their influence.

securities also reflect the safety of the investment. As a

Money. Like many large profitable corporations,

result, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enjoy an effective

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac devote resources to politi-

duopoly over the secondary market for home loans.7

cal activities. Political expenditures can take many forms:

The tremendous volume of loans handled by Fannie Mae

personnel devoted to legislative or political liaison, de-

and Freddie Mac results in significant financial obligations,

velopment of educational materials, and advertising. Fed-

at present approximately $2.4 trillion (OFHEO 1997), a

eral Election Commission records reveal that executives

liability that largely went unnoticed before the savings and
of both companies contributed heavily to the political
loan crisis in the 1980s. The S&L debacle served as a pain-

campaigns of relevant committee members (including the

ful reminder that off-budget liability could become quite

years during which the Federal Housing Enterprise Safety

tangible. Congress included a provision in the 1989 bail-

and Soundness Act of 1992 was under consideration), and

out law calling for a study of the government's GSE liabil-

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac appear on congressional

ity.8 The subsequent budget reconciliation act called for

honoraria reports for speaking engagements. Fannie Mae,

additional reports and mandated congressional action on

for a time, ran a political action committee (Fannie PAC),

GSE regulatory reform, setting the stage for the strugglewhich was disbanded after its existence generated critithat is the focus of this article.9 Prior to the passage of the
cism. Both companies frequently advertise in popular
Federal Housing Enterprise Safety and Soundness Act of
media and publications aimed at congressional members
1992, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had been overseen by

and staff.

a few HUD employees, none of whom were dedicated to

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enjoy financial resources,

the task full time. ' The act, signed by President George

not by chance, but as a function of their structure. They

Bush, created a new quasi-independent regulatory agency

enjoy legally protected partial franchises and are profit-

and strengthened HUD's statutory authority.

able, at least in part, due to the implicit support of the federal government. Because every aspect of their operations

Hybrid Characteristics and GSE Influence
On matters pertaining to housing and housing finance,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are influential participants

in the legislative process. Freddie Mac and particularly
Fannie Mae have been identified as influential political
players in Washington (Bradsher 1992; Labaton 1991;
Matlack 1990; Nitschke 1998). This surprises those who
presume the two GSEs are "part of the government," not
organized interests. In fact, that confusion helps to explain

the two companies' political power. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are powerful because they possess resources

that are generally associated with both private and public
sector institutions. '

No pejorative connotation should be inferred from this

can be affected by congressional action, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac have powerful incentives to devote significant attention to Congress and to politics in general. Thus,
one can conclude that GSEs will possess resources and

motives to expend them for political advantage.
Electoral Connection. As purchasers of mortgages in
every congressional district in the United States, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac are of potential interest to every

member of Congress. Their centrality in the American sys-

tem of home finance makes issues related to Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac salient for representatives interested in
the financial well-being of their constituents, an effective
hook on which to hang lobbying efforts.
Understanding this, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac employ strategies to reinforce their connection to member's

description of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Although
districts. Fannie Mae, for instance, produces computercontemporary discourse frequently paints "political influgenerated maps that graphically display how much busience" in negative terms, it is not intended here to convey
ness the company is doing in each congressional district.
nefarious intentions or deeds. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
The two companies also steer corporate attention to memhave been successful in pursuing their legislative agendas;
bers. At announcements of new affordable-housing initiathis article simply offers an explanation.
tives and other lending programs, elected officials are given

The Private Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac: GSEs as Interest Groups

the opportunity to bask in the positive attention generated
by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.

Loyal Allies. Lenders, realtors, and other housing-re-

The political activities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

lated trade organizations that depend on Fannie Mae and

are restricted in the same ways as any private company.

Freddie Mac for their business can be mobilized to bolster

Both companies lobby Congress, build relationships with

the GSEs' political strength. Again, the structural domi-

individual politicians, and cultivate a network of other

nance of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac ensures the avail-

interest groups. This is a brief summary of the private-

ability of this resource. The GSEs' status secures their hold

470 Public Administration Review * July/August 2001, Vol. 61, No. 4
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on a large share of the residential mortgage market. Thus,

consensus, bureaucracies (and the individuals who popu-

relationships with partners are asymmetric, and Fannie Mae

late them) are part of the political process. Although nu-

and Freddie Mac have historically relied on consistent sup-

merous models have been offered to capture the place of

port from organizations with national memberships.

bureaucracy in that process, all agree that public bureau-

Critics have accused Fannie Mae of being heavy handed

cracies possess resources that can be utilized for political

in its efforts to maintain solidarity. In 1986, Salomon Broth-

influence (Hill 1991). The public aspects of government-

ers opposed Fannie Mae's bid to amend its charter and

sponsored enterprises endow them with many of the re-

expand its business. Not only did Salomon fail to stop

sources attributed to public bureaucracies. This influence

Fannie Mae, it was cut off from the lucrative underwriting

complements the private-side resources.

business that Fannie Mae had steered toward the Wall Street

Unassailability. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are in a

firm (Matlack 1990; Taub and Gold 1989). Fannie Mae

unique position to claim their successful performance as a

withdrew advertising from The Economist after several

matter of national importance. Chartered by Congress, the

articles-and editorial cartoons-portrayed Fannie Mae

two GSEs represent a governmental effort to help Ameri-

and Freddie Mac unfavorably (Matlack 1990). Fannie Mae

cans purchase their own homes. Housing is, in the words

has also been accused of using donations from its chari-

of one Fannie Mae executive, a "white hat issue." Fannie

table foundations to coerce political support from depen-

Mae and Freddie Mac can strategically "wrap themselves

dent nonprofit organizations (Zuckman 199 la).

in the flag" and make attacks politically costly.

The 1999 formation of "FM Watch," an interest group

Expertise. Experience, information, and technical ex-

created by mortgage-industry businesses and trade asso-

pertise sometimes give bureaucracies the upper hand in

ciations, suggests that the landscape may be changing. FM

negotiations (Rourke 1984). In the case of Fannie Mae and

Watch is a response to the feared expansion of Fannie Mae

Freddie Mac, nonprofit organizations and congressional

and Freddie Mac business into new areas of the mortgage

committees do not have the resources to conduct research

market (Schroeder 1999).

and develop arguments with the breadth and depth of the

Network Dominance. Former, current, and potential

GSEs. Even HUD can be outmatched.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac employees constitute an ex-

This advantage was particularly evident during consid-

tensive network in the housing finance community. The

eration of legislation pertaining to the capital stress tests,

two GSEs offer the opportunity to work on housing-re-

computer simulations that would determine capital require-

lated issues with private-sector compensation and unpar-

ments for each GSE. Individuals with sufficient technical

alleled levels of substantive engagement. As one former

proficiency to challenge the GSEs' claims were sprinkled

congressional aide (now working for a GSE) put it, "If

throughout the administration and congressional staff.

you're interested in housing and finance in the United

These individuals were, by their own accounts, outgunned.

As a result, the GSEs dominated the crafting of legislation
States, there is no better place to be working than at Fannie
regarding these tests.

Mae or Freddie Mac."

As a result, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac personnel ros-

Insiders. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are historically

ters boast numerous alumni of the executive and legisla-

and structurally linked to the federal government. Many

tive branches, with both the Democratic and Republican

home loans insured by the federal government are pur-

parties well-represented. For example, current CEO

chased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Both companies

Franklin Raines recently returned to Fannie Mae after a

have worked with HUD on program evaluation and inno-

stint as head of the Office of Management and Budget;

vation. Like many housing organizations, HUD relies on

the GSEs in such partnerships because they offer expertise
Newt Gingrich recently signed on as a consultant to Freddie
and financial resources. Finally, the GSEs' long-term reMac. The two companies thus gain expertise and connections to key players in the legislative process and the

peated interaction with members of Congress and their

has given them the opportunity to build strong relaadministration's policy formulation. Furthermore, there staffs
is
tionships. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac emphasize differan impressive history of GSE executives crossing back into
ent
strategies. One senior GSE officer noted that Freddie
government service, giving the company advantages in
terms of access, and sympathy, at the highest levels.

Mac has focused on maintaining strong relationships with
the executive branch, while Fannie Mae has traditionally

The Public Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: GSEs
as Powerful Bureaucracies

maintained strong ties on Capitol Hill.

The Best of Both Worlds: More Powerful than
The politics-administration dichotomy that is attributed
to Woodrow Wilson exists as an ideal; such separation is

Agency or Private Company

feasible, even in Wilson's account, only with agreement

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac possess more resources as

on the ends of government (Wilson 1887). Barring such

hybrids than they would as fully private or fully public entiHybrid Organizations and the Alignment of Interests 471
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ties. This point can be illustrated by considering two fictitious mortgage-purchasing entities. Consider the cases of

following sections describe the alignment of interests

around Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and illustrate the
the Federal Mortgage Agency, part of the executive branch,
significance of this arrangement with examples from the
and Acme Mortgage Corporation, a private company.
drafting of the Federal Housing Enterprise Safety and
The Federal Mortgage Agency would be subject to po-

Soundness Act of 1992.

litical control, run by a political appointee, and answerable to the president. It could not take retributive actions

The Alignment of Interests Around Fanni
Mae and Freddie Mac

against businesses or interest groups that failed to endorse
its legislative agenda. As a result, the Federal Mortgage

Government-sponsored enterprises are governed by

Agency's behavior would be limited. It could not take positions independent of the administration. Without the latitude to punish clients and partners who do not act as allies

in the political realm, it could not coerce surrogates. The
Federal Mortgage Agency could not independently lobby
Congress. It could not serve particular areas selectively
and strategically. Moreover, the agency would be subject
to a host of federal management laws and regulations governing everything from personnel to procurement.
Now consider another fictitious entity, the privately
owned Acme Mortgage Corporation. Acme could spend
large sums of money to cultivate political good will with
impunity. It could enlist support from dependent institutions on key policy issues. However, as a private corporation, Acme would be restricted by federal financial laws. It
would not have the implicit backing of the federal government or exemption from federal regulations and state or

local taxes. Finally, Acme would not enjoy the imprimatur

three objectives that could conflict with one another:
1. To fulfill programmatic policy purposes. In the case of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, this means providing
greater access to mortgage credit markets.

2. To maintain a financially safe and sound operation that
minimizes risk to the federal government.
3. To operate as a profitable private company that maintains a consistent return to shareholders.

Reckless pursuit of profits could undermine achieve-

ment of public purposes and expose the federal government to financial risk. Overly risk-averse regulation of financial safety and soundness could hinder the GSEs'

abilities to meet programmatic goals or limit profitability.

Overly ambitious programmatic goals could adversely affect the GSEs' profitability or even their financial safet
and soundness.

This suggests a triangular arrangement of interests
around the GSEs, each point potentially at odds with the

of public purpose and the mandate of the federal charter. other two (See figure 2). A brief description of the interest
In short, neither the Federal Mortgage Agency nor Acmegroups at each point of this triangle introduces the source
Mortgage Corporation would likely wield the same ecoof conflict between interests in the case of Fannie Mae and

nomic and political influence that Fannie Mae and Freddie
Freddie Mac.
Mac display. As government-sponsored enterprises, Fannie
Programmatic Considerations. Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mae and Freddie Mac have all the advantages of our fictiMac are regarded as part of the federal response to the
tious entities and none of the disadvantages. It is not sur-public's housing needs. Although they were created to staprising that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac resist calls for bilize mortgage markets, eliminate regional disparities in
privatization, which could mean severing the remaining
credit availability, and facilitate home buying among
ties to the federal government. As one congressional staff
middle- and working-class Americans, Fannie Mae and
member who has worked closely with the GSEs concluded, Freddie Mac should now, in the view of housing advoFannie Mae and Freddie Mac are "more powerful than if cates, focus on providing credit opportunities for
they were private or if they were public."
underserved markets and borrowers. Thus, proponents of
housing for low- and moderate-income communities, generally nonprofit organizations, are pressing Fannie Mae and
The Alignment of Interests around GSEs
Freddie Mac to devote additional resources to housing for
Terry Moe (1989) argues that interest groups can shape
less-affluent Americans. The Department of Housing and
bureaucracies for their own advantage. Although this case
Urban Development shares this interest in the GSEs' prostudy is consistent with Moe's hypothesis, this article isgrammatic function.
primarily concerned with an additional claim that is, in a Profitability. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are both

sense, the converse of Moe's. The structure of instituprofit-seeking companies, an orientation that is codified in
tions can shape the preferences of interest groups. In thisthe GSEs' charters. Even the clause pronouncing Fannie

case, the arrangement of interests around Fannie Mae and

Freddie Mac reflect the organizational features of GSEs.
Furthermore, this alignment of interests was pivotal in
determining the outcome of the legislative process. The

Mae's obligation to provide assistance to low- and moderate-income borrowers specifies that the company is entitled
to a "reasonable economic return" on a// programs (12 U.S.
Code 1716).

472 Public Administration Review * July/August 2001, Vol. 61, No. 4
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Of course, the most interested parties in the profitabil-

its revenues (BNA Banking Report 1990). Freddie Mac has

ity of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are their owners and

written off millions of dollars in losses on poorly managed

managers. Stockholders' desire for the companies to main-

programs (Economist 1989). If, for example, even one GSE

tain their market status creates a powerful incentive for

were unable to meet its current outstanding obligations,

executives. Like many corporate managers, executives at

the federal government would be stuck with a bill for hun-

both companies are judged and compensated based, in large

dreds of billions of dollars.

Interest groups concerned with the financial safety and

part, on stock performance. Thus, the corporate leadership
is likely to resist legislation that would make it more diffi-

soundness of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are not readily

visible. If Fannie Mae can produce a higher rate of return

cult to maintain stock value.

The normative question of whether government-spon-

for its stockholders by maintaining a small cushion of re-

sored enterprises should be profit oriented is not relevant

serve capital, the stockholders benefit. The increased risk

to this article. The fact that GSEs are profit-seeking enti-

is borne by the federal government, and the stockholder

ties is integral to explaining their behavior. The ownership

can bail out if the company's fortunes deteriorate. Wall

of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, an "interest group" con-

Street investment banks are equally unconcerned with fi-

cerned with the profitability of their companies, brings a

nancial safety and soundness: As long as investors are con-

distinct set of interests before Congress.

fident that the federal government guarantees Fannie Mae

The profitability of other companies may also be at

and Freddie Mac securities, their business is not affected.
At stake, then, is the creditworthiness of the federal

stake when Congress considers government-sponsored

enterprises. Primary market lenders (banks, thrifts, mort-

government. Unfortunately, the public good of "creditwor-

gage bankers) depend on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

thiness" is diffuse and indivisible, difficult to organize an

Without the stream of capital the GSEs guarantee, many

interest group around. This is a logical extension of the

lenders could not function. Home builders, realtors, mort-

observations that Stanley Surrey offers on the politics of

gage insurers, contractors, landscapers, and other hous-

tax breaks; the cost of tax loopholes is so diffuse as to be

ing-related industries recognize the critical role of Fannie

nonexistent (Surrey 1976). The costs to taxpayers presented

Mae and Freddie Mac; more loans means more business.

by GSEs is even more diffuse. In fact, there is only a risk

Similarly, Wall Street firms that handle the multimillion-

of cost. By analogy, then, legislative resistance to GSE risk

dollar issuances of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securi-

should be lower than it is for tax breaks.
The strongest institutional advocate for fiscal prudence

ties have a strong interest in the two companies. The more

business the GSEs are doing, the more income such firms

is the Treasury Department, which took the lead in drafting

earn by underwriting the sale of debt and mortgage secu-

the safety and soundness legislation. A handful of "public

rities to investors.

interest" groups and members of Congress raised the risk

presented by government-sponsored enterprises. It is tellOf course, there can be serious disagreements among
ing, however, that perhaps the single most effective advothese groups. For example, some financial institutions that
cate for safety and soundness regulation has been a private
depend on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac complain they
cannot compete with the GSEs because of their preferen-

individual, Washington attorney Thomas Stanton, a former

tial status. One should not assume that all mortgage-re-

Fannie Mae associate general counsel and self-appointed

lated businesses would naturally endorse proposals ben-

activist for financial safety and soundness. Stanton's 1991

eficial to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.

book, State of Risk, and his personal lobbying were influen-

Financial Safety and Soundness. The combined out-

tial in the legislative process (Matlack 1990; Rauch 1991).

standing debt of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac exceeds $740
billion (OFHEO 1997). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guarantees cover more than $1.1 trillion in outstanding mort-

gage securities (OFHEO 1997). To give some perspective,

Alignment in Action: Redesigning a
Regulatory Framework
The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and

the housing GSEs' $2.4 trillion combined liability is greaterSoundness Act of 1992 took shape over three years. Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac worked with the administration to
than the actual or projected total outlays of the U.S. federal government in any single year.

develop the initial proposal and later negotiated with con-

gressional staff. This gave the GSEs, as a former Office of
risk is quite real. The financial conditions of Fannie Mae Management and Budget official described it, "two bites
at the apple." The alignment of interests, combined with
and Freddie Mac, for example, are very sensitive to interthe resources available to the GSEs, allowed Fannie Mae
est rate movements. Unforeseen shifts in the market can
Although such large numbers may seem abstract, the

have catastrophic consequences. Fannie Mae absorbed

and Freddie Mac to shift the debate from disadvantageous

"substantial losses" in the early 1980s when interest rates

issues to more favorable ground. Yet the history of the leg-

rose and the companies' borrowing costs greatly exceed

islation shows that opponents recognized this strategy and,
Hybrid Organizations and the Alignment of Interests 473
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to some extent, counteracted it successfully. This section

administration's desire to maintain a united front forced a

considers three key elements of the act: regulatory struc-

compromise: separation of safety and soundness from pro-

ture, capital standards, and affordable-housing goals.

grammatic regulation within HUD. The Treasury was sat-

Regulatory Structure. The act divided regulatory au-

isfied that the OFHEO director was sufficiently insulated

thority over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac between a new,

from the HUD secretary. According to the statute, "The

quasi-independent agency, the Office of Federal Housing

Director is authorized, without the review or approval of

Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), and HUD. OFHEO is re-

the Secretary, to make such determinations, take such ac-

sponsible for safety and soundness regulation, while HUD

tions, and perform such functions as the Director deter-

is responsible for programmatic regulation. This outcome

mines necessary" to set capital standards, issue and en-

resulted from a combination of congressional politics, fear

force regulations, and examine Fannie Mae and Freddie

of regulatory capture, and the GSEs' desire to maintain

Mac (12 U.S. Code 4513).

Congress's role in the oversight process.

Still, the HUD secretary retains the right of approval

The fear of regulatory capture came from all points of

over any OFHEO actions that are not directly required by

the interest group triangle. Safety and soundness advocates

the legislation. OFHEO submits its appropriations requests

worried that a small, independent regulatory agency could

and clears drafts of proposed regulations through the Of-

be influenced by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and that

fice of Management and Budget. The OFHEO director is

HUD would subordinate safety and soundness to program-

appointed by the president, with Senate confirmation, to a

matic goals. Affordable-housing advocates were wary of

five-year term. Fears that the safety and soundness regula-

Treasury regulation because safety and soundness might

tors would dominate programmatic interests were allayed

dominate programmatic considerations. The GSEs were

because the secretary retained direct authority over pro-

grammatic
leery of any regulator that might hinder their ability to
func- oversight (see figure 3).
Several senators and their staffs disliked the compro-

tion successfully.

The May 1991 General Accounting Office report to

mise. Expressing their sentiments, Senator Carl Levin (D-

Congress recommended the creation of a federal enterprise

MI) commented that "the better course of action would

regulatory board to oversee all government-sponsored en-

have been to place the regulator of housing enterprises

terprises. Such a regulator would have "the visibility and

outside of HUD" (Cong. Rec. 1992, S8652). But the Sen-

capability to act promptly and effectively if a government- ate gave the House the structure it wanted in exchange for
sponsored enterprise experiences severe difficulties" (GAO

concessions in the areas of capital standards and afford-

1991, 46). The "super-regulator" idea, however, was

able-housing goals. Congressional staff note that Fannie

doomed from the outset. The proposed super-regulator

Mae lobbied heavily with more sympathetic House mem-

would have overseen agricultural, educational, and hous-

bers to maintain HUD's authority. The compromise, it was

ing GSEs. Thus, the agriculture and education committees

concluded, was the best available deal. "They could have

would likely have lost jurisdiction over their GSEs to the

been stronger," said Levin, "but at least the regulator does

banking committee. Such changes are not generally wel-

not report to the Secretary when it comes to safety and

comed enthusiastically (see Fenno 1973). Furthermore,

soundness" (Cong. Rec. 1992, S8652).

existing regulators resisted efforts to strip away their au-

thority and, in some cases, their reason for existence.
The critical issue was whether HUD should retain regu-

As a final bit of protection, Fannie Mae fought to keep

channels of congressional review in place as an insurance
policy. Significant examples of this strategy include the

latory authority or whether a new regulatory agency should

requirements that OFHEO clear all proposed regulations

be created to oversee Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The

through oversight committees and go through the yearly

GSEs took different positions regarding the optimal regu-

appropriations review (a requirement that bank regulators

latory structure. Fannie Mae argued that HUD should con-

are not subject to). Critics of the final law note that be-

tinue in its role as regulator. A politically insulated inde-

cause the independent safety and soundness regulator was

pendent regulator might diminish the value of relationships

subject to the congressional appropriations process, the

with HUD and Congress that Fannie Mae had long culti-

GSEs would have "a chance to exercise influence over the

vated. Freddie Mac, on the other hand, favored the inde-

regulator by lobbying the Appropriations committees"

pendent-regulator proposal. One independent regulator

(Taylor 1992). Administrative and congressional staff ex-

with safety and soundness as well as programmatic au-

plain that they understood why Fannie Mae wanted the

thority over the two housing GSEs, Freddie Mac argued,

appropriations clause inserted and that it could cause diffi-

would produce more coherent regulation.'2

culties for OFHEO in the future. Nevertheless, the clause

The Treasury Department favored the creation of a

was accepted to get the bill passed.

single, independent regulator, while HUD was loathe to

Although there is some substantive justification for the

surrender its regulatory authority. The Bush

division of regulatory responsibility, this case study supports
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Moe's glum conclusion that, given the objectives and influ-

manding capital standards would threaten the GSEs' ability

ence of interest groups, the democratic process is unlikely

to perform their programmatic functions (U.S. Senate 1991,

"to promote effective organization (T. Moe 1989, 329).

Setting Capital Standards. The three congressionally
mandated reports on the regulation of government-spon-

197; U.S. House 199 lb, 36). By invoking the housing functions of their companies, as they did in arguing against regu-

latory discretion, the two executives portrayed the capital

sored enterprises recognized the need for meaningful capi-

standards debate as a conflict between programmatic goals

tal requirements to ensure the GSEs have enough money

and fiscal safety. This deflected attention from profitability.

to cover losses. With each loan purchased, Fannie Mae and

Other interest groups interested in profitability joined

Freddie Mac assume credit risk (the borrower may not re-

this chorus. Stephen Ashley, president of the Mortgage

pay the loan) and interest rate risk (Fannie Mae or Freddie

Bankers Association, warned that "excessive capital re-

Mac may have to pay higher interest rates on debt than

quirements are not necessary and, in fact, would limit credit

they receive from borrowers.) Although maintaining rea-

availability and raise interest rates for homebuyers" (U.S.

sonable capital is prudent, holding excess capital is ineffi-

House 1991b, 72). Not coincidentally, that would mean a

cient; reserve capital does not maximize return. Thus, there

loss of business for the members of Ashley's organization.

is tension between the need for capital reserves and the

The California Association of Realtors argued that "Any

increase in required capital for the FNMA and FHLMC

desire to utilize capital profitably.

The general approach suggested by the reports and

will reduce the supply of lendable funds in the primary

agreed to by the administration and the GSEs was a two-

mortgage market and raise mortgage interest rates" and

part capital standard: a minimum capital standard, a

dismissed the prospects of a taxpayer bailout as "extremely

baseline ratio of retained capital to liabilities, and a risk-

remote" (U.S. Senate 1991, 380).

based capital standard, a more complex requirement de-

More tellingly, interest groups clustered around the pro-

rived from projected losses under computer-simulated eco-

grammatic node rallied against stringent safety and sound-

nomic scenarios. The initial question was how much

ness regulations. In their testimony before Congress, af-

latitude Congress should grant OFHEO to translate the law

fordable-housing advocates argued against higher capital

into precise regulations.

standards. Paul Grogan, president of the Local Initiatives

The GSEs disagreed on the desirability of regulatory

Support Corporation, a national nonprofit development

discretion to specify the capital standards. Freddie Mac

organization, raised the danger that safety and soundness

favored regulatory discretion, but Fannie Mae sought to

regulation would adversely affect affordable-housing pro-

have Congress define as much of the risk-based capital

grams: "A regulator focusing only on safety and sound-

standard as possible to constrain any future regulatory

ness will not take into account the impact of its actions on

agency. The Treasury Department wanted OFHEO to have

low-income housing and communities" (U.S. House 199 ]b,

complete discretion in setting capital standards.

412). Such statements were not uncommon among afford-

Fannie Mae invoked programmatic concerns in its arguments against discretion. A company spokesman sug-

able-housing advocates (HDR 1991).
The mobilization of interest groups suggests the conse-

gested that a regulator with discretion could impose "suchquences of the alignment of interests. In a conflict between
profitability and safety and soundness, the programmatic
a high capital standard that the corporation would be unable to fulfill its housing mission" (Zuckman 199 lb), an

node was a swing faction. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

argument endorsed by corporate supporters (HDR 1992).

used their resources to recruit groups clustered around this

The final legislation spelled out most of the minimum capi-node. The Treasury Department, the only institutional advocate of safety and soundness, had no such ability.
tal requirement and a great deal of the risk-based capital
requirement. Keeping the determination of capital stan-

In advocating more stringent capital standards for the

dards in the legislative domain was consistent with Fannie GSEs, Treasury representatives sought to distinguish the
Mae's strategy throughout the legislative process: capitalize on the good congressional relationships that had been
cultivated and maintained over several years.

points of opposition. A central theme of Undersecretary
Robert Glauber's testimony before Congress was that
higher capital requirements do not necessitate reductions

in affordable-housing support or increases in interest rates
Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac expressed differor fees charged to American home buyers. "It should be

ent views on several specific questions, the two GSEs both
argued against legislation that would raise capital levels.

possible for these institutions to raise significant amounts

Once the capital standards battle was kept in Congress, the of capital and do so without raising their prices," explained
Glauber. "What it would mean would be somewhat of a
GSEs focused on shaping the regulations. Leland Brendsel,
James Johnson, chairman and chief executive officer of

reduction in the rate of return that they make (U.S. House
1991b, 24)." Under questioning from Senator Jake Gain

Fannie Mae, both testified before Congress that overly de-

on the impact of increased capital requirements on mort-

chairman and chief executive officer of Freddie Mac, and
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gage interest rates, Glauber reiterated, "If anybody bore

attempted to enlist groups clustered at the safety and sound-

the burden, it would be the shareholders and not

ness and profitability nodes to thwart the efforts of hous-

homebuyers" (U.S. House 1991b, 23).

ing proponents at the programmatic node.

The problem with Glauber's claim lay in the struc-

With Congress overhauling the regulation of Fannie Mae

tural independence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

and Freddie Mac, interest groups that had been pressing

Given the absence of direct governmental control over

the GSEs to contribute more to the development of low-

the two companies, there was no guarantee that increased

income and affordable housing saw an opportunity. The

capital standards would not adversely affect housing

affordable-housing aspect of the legislation was introduced

programs. While the companies could lower their rates

when House Banking Committee chairman Henry

of return, they could just as easily raise the fees charged

Gonzalez inserted a provision requiring the GSEs to allot

to borrowers. Both the General Accounting Office and

an amount equal to 20 percent of the previous year's divi-

Congressional Budget Office recognized this possibil-

dend payments to the Federal Home Loan Banks "'Afford-

ity and even calculated adjustments in rates paid by bor-

able Housing Program," which subsidizes rental units for

rowers required to help GSEs meet higher capital re-

low-income families. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were

quirements. A 1996 Congressional Budget Office report
on the GSEs made the point more starkly, noting that
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac effectively decide how

animated in their opposition to Gonzalez's subsidization

ject was vehement, they marshaled significant resistance

much of the federal subsidy that is implicit in the ad-

from their allies, and the subsidization program was even-

vantages they receive is passed on to borrowers.

Negotiations between Senate staff and representatives
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac resulted in the risk-based

provision (U.S. House 1991b). Their testimony on the sub-

tually removed from the bill (with the blessing of many
members of Congress who had argued the provision was a
corruption of the GSEs' mission).

capital requirement (more stringent than the House ver-

The battle saw a parade of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

sion) that was included in the final bill. The conference

allies rising to the GSEs' defense. The comments submitted

committee adopted the Senate's capital standards and pa-by a host of Wall Street investment firms indicated that proframeters for a risk-based capital stress test. When the GSEsitability was as significant in the resistance to the affordfaced an unpalatable component of the capital standard in
able-housing goals as was safety and soundness. Jonathan
Congress, they argued for regulatory discretion, hoping toGray, for example, an analyst specializing in GSEs, asked
fight the battle another more advantageous day.'3 Suffice it
members of the House subcommittee, "[H]ow would you
to say, the compromise left ample room for dispute befeel, placing your money at risk, in a venture whose profits
tween the new regulator and the GSEs.'4

accrue to you only after a third party has extracted an interThe legislative history of the capital standards confirms est, the amount of which interest is subject to change at any

the influence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Not only time?" (U.S. House 199 lb, 406). Many financial-sector parwere the GSEs able to employ their considerable political

ticipants that depend on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to

power, the organization of interests around government-

provide a large, lucrative share of their business urged mem-

sponsored enterprises allowed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
bers to recognize the importance of profitability, which, they
to enlist groups with programmatic interests for their battle suggested, was crucial to the success of government-sponagainst stringent capital standards. Furthermore, the trian- sored enterprises. Unlike Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
gular arrangement of interests dictated the strategic behav- which (as GSEs) risked offending the public with overt
ior of the Treasury Department. In practice, this meant driv- emphasis of profitability, these firms were politically safe to

ing a wedge between the programmatic and profitability argue profitability and understood that it was in their businodes by arguing that the GSEs could cut profits to meet ness interest to support Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
stricter capital requirements rather than paring affordable-

The backlash prompted Gonzalez to scrap his proposal

housing programs. Given the resources at the GSEs' dis-

and order the GSEs and housing groups to reach a com-

posal, this strategy proved unworkable.

promise, a move that proved controversial. In an episode

Housing Goals. There is tension between the program- recounted differently by all participants, representatives of
matic mission of the GSEs and both profitability and safety the affordable-housing groups met with representatives of

and soundness. Although the programmatic goals are pub- the GSEs and negotiated language that was inserted into
licly unassailable, there is resistance on the part of the GSEs the first House bill. The two paragraphs created a weak
to the additional burden of programmatic regulation. While requirement "that a reasonable portion of the corporation's
fighting higher capital standards, programmatic goals were

mortgage purchases be related to the national goal of pro-

invoked by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and allies to dull

viding adequate housing for low- and moderate-income

the impact of safety and soundness regulations. In the case

families, but with reasonable economic return to the cor-

of affordable-housing goals, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

poration" (U.S. Congress 1991, 20, emphasis added).
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Some observers, including Rep. James Leach (R-IA),

it. Although the Treasury Department's reports on GSE regu-

cried foul and argued that Fannie Mae had bought off the

lation and testimony before Congress made it clear that safety

affordable-housing groups with donations from its Fannie

should be the paramount regulatory concern, the housing

Mae Foundation. Housing groups that were dependent on

goals could be approved with confidence that safety and

the money, it was alleged, were forced to choose between

soundness would not be jeopardized.

supporting Fannie Mae and sacrificing funds (Zuckman

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac argued the programmatic

1991 a).'5 According to a former committee staffer, mem-

goals were poorly defined and difficult to meet, yet they

bers of the committee chose not to fight for tougher regu-

could not attack them on principle. Thus, the only mecha-

lations when the affordable-housing groups signed off.

nism available was to enlist the third node: safety and

The situation was different on the Senate side. A bipar-

soundness. The Treasury's unwillingness to endorse the

tisan group of senators of varying ideological backgrounds

argument that safety and soundness would be threatened

called for greater dedication to programmatic goals. Chair-

by the affordable-housing goals diluted the strength of this

man Donald Riegle (D-MI) and ranking minority member

approach. The GSEs argued they were already working to

Jake Garn (R-OH) both supported more ambitious afford-

expand lending to low- and moderate-income families, but

able-housing goals. Riegle introduced the Senate bill on

without the support of the safety and soundness node the

the floor, noting that "[HUD regulations] have been too

GSEs could not eliminate the goals.

weak and often have not been enforced. So the bill creates

The inclusion of affordable housing goals was not an

better standards with specific enforcement tools that will

overwhelming defeat of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The

require the GSE's to increase their efforts to provide fi-

deletion of the rent-subsidization program demonstrated

nancing for those who need it most" (Cong. Rec. 1992,

that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could influence the craft-

S8607). Others, such as Senator Alan Dixon (D-IL), were

ing of the goals and avoid their most disliked designs when

more strident: "Congress must send a strong message to

alliances among interests were not formed. The GSEs'

the GSE's that they have important public purposes which

political muscle was used effectively to mobilize sympa-

must be fulfilled. Their responsibilities are not just to their

thetic interest groups in the housing and financial sectors.

shareholders who have benefited handsomely from the

As the testimony on the Affordable Housing Program sub-

GSE's unique relationship to the Federal Government.

sidy indicates, a range of groups lobbied against the re-

Their responsibilities are also to the public: To maintain

quirement. Most importantly, the Treasury's antipathy to-

their financial safety, but also to assure that our housing

ward this provision was never in doubt. It was dropped

finance markets work for the benefit of all Americans-

from the conference version of the bill.

not just the affluent" (Cong. Rec. 1992, S8651). The af-

Furthermore, critics point out that the goals did not force

fordable-housing provisions of the bill were solidified and

the GSEs to finance significantly higher levels of afford-

specified, effectively adding enforcement provisions and

able housing than Fannie Mae was funding at the time of

force of law to existing HUD housing goals.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were reluctant to express

the bill's passage. Also the enforcement mechanisms are
extremely weak. HUD can do little more than admonish

opposition to housing goals in principle and, in fact, en-

the GSEs if they do not meet goals. Finally, HUD may be

dorsed the Senate legislation after extensive negotiation.

reluctant to damage the productive working relationships

Groups sympathetic to the GSEs resisted the housing goals, it has established with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
testifying they were unnecessary and potentially damag-

Epilogue. It is still too early to pass judgment on the

ing to the enterprises. '6 For example, Fannie Mae, Freddie efficacy of the new regulatory regime. OFHEO has finalMac, the National Association of Realtors, the Mortgage

ized and applied the minimum capital standards (both

Bankers Association, and the National Association of Home

companies have complied) and recently published its pro-

Builders visited members en masse and warned against

posed risk-based capital regulation, beginning what is sure

to be a contentious period of negotiation and gamesmanthe dangers of stretching the GSEs. Overly ambitious housing goals, they claimed, could jeopardize their safety and

ship with the GSEs, Congress, and the administration

soundness and cost taxpayers billions.

(Connor 1999; OFHEO 1997). Under the proposed rule

On this issue, the advocates of safety and soundness were Freddie Mac would meet the capital standards, while
in the swing position. Initially, the Treasury resisted the goals,Fannie Mae would not.

fearing they might pose a threat to safety and soundness,

The housing goals passed by Congress had a three-part

though this position was never taken publicly. Treasury of- requirement with interim goals in low-income, central citficials recognized that without the support of housing inter-ies, and special affordable categories. Although there has
ests that demanded the affordable-housing goals and, more

been some controversy regarding HUD's interpretation of

importantly, the Senators who agreed with them, the bill

the law, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac met most of

would never pass and safety and soundness would die with

the interim targets (failing in the central cities category).
Hybrid Organizations and the Alignment of Interests 477
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HUD just recently proposed its final regulation, which

overseeing them. However, the structure of government-

would raise the target for loans to low- and moderate-in-

sponsored enterprises is a key factor in explaining the discome families from 42 percent to 50 percent by the end oftinguishing influence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. It
the year 2001 (Day 1999). Fannie Mae, but not Freddie
endows the GSE with resources for political influence and
Mac, has expressed its acceptance of the new goals.

results in an arrangement of interest groups that allows

Arguments against the new capital rules and housing

and rewards strategic manipulation. Although greater specigoals have conformed to the patterns described in this ar- fication is required, the point is noteworthy. Like genetic
ticle. In both cases, the third node-programmatic conmutations, some hybrid organizations may continue to
cerns in the first case, financial safety in the second-has

change-sometimes in ways that are neither foreseen nor

been invoked to tilt the scales toward profitability.

desired by their creators.

Implications

Hybrid Institutions: Out of Control or
Self-Control?

From the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, implicaLloyd Musolf and Harold Seidman (1980) warn that
tions can be inferred regarding the ramifications of organi- government-sponsored enterprises are governmental instizational structure for GSEs and other hybrid institutions.
tutions beyond the control of government. This proposi-

Organizational Structure as a Feedback Loop

tion offends the ideals of popular sovereignty and govern-

ment accountability. While it does not appear that any

As Terry Moe contends, interest group influence in thegovernmental entity "controls" Fannie Mae and Freddie
legislative process partially explains the creation of a regu-Mac, this study suggests a more complicated truth: The
latory infrastructure for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac thatinfrastructure to "control" them may exist, but GSEs have
is saddled with contradictions and ambiguities. In each
the resources, ability, and position to control their own
component of the Federal Housing Enterprise Safety and
controllers. "7
Soundness Act of 1992, the GSEs were able to dilute or
This conclusion is offered while sidestepping the sizobfuscate the objectives. However, this account glosses over able literature devoted to the problematic concept of conFannie Mae and Freddie Mac's ability to shape and matrol. That is possible because the point is straightforward.
nipulate interest group preferences. This suggests the need If government-sponsored enterprises can, by nature, exert

for refinement of Moe's argument.

great influence over those responsible for controlling them,
The previous section illustrated that the triangular arrangeit is difficult to imagine a definition of control that would
ment of interests rewarded actors who maintained alliances be satisfied.

between interest group nodes. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Concrete conclusions are inappropriate. Not only is it

were able, in the view of first-hand observers, to design theirtoo early to judge the success or failure of the Federal

regulation. They did so with the assistance of allies, many
Housing Enterprise Safety and Soundness Act of 1992,
of whom had little self-interest in helping the GSEs. Modalternative proposals for regulating Fannie Mae and Freddie
els of interest group participation in institution building
Mac might provide more stringent oversight. For example,

should account for organizations with the ability to manipu-a proposed super-regulator for all government-sponsored

late preferences of other groups for their own self-interest.enterprises might be more independent and less prone to
In this case, the politics of structure could be representedcapture than a single-purpose, quasi-independent office of
as a feedback loop. By exerting influence on the crafting of HUD. Still, this case should serve as a warning to those

the 1992 legislation, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac effec- seeking to employ a hybrid organization. Designers of fu-

tively influenced their own regulatory structure. This, in turn,
ture hybrids must be aware of the political potential of the
guaranteed their influence in the future. The limits of this organizations they are creating. Few would have antici-

loop are unclear. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, for example,
pated that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would grow into
have agitated for congressional charter amendments to political heavyweights.

broaden the scope of potential activities, engendering seri- Government-sponsored enterprises are an intriguing alous opposition from formidable opponents including theternative form of government. Their ability to address puborganization of FM Watch as a political counterweight. lic needs at no direct expense to the taxpayer makes them
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will likely counter any efforts appealing, particularly when paring the cost of government

by FM Watch to diminish their influence in aggressive fash-is a concern. This article introduces some nonbudgetary ramiion. Thus a new test of the GSEs' influence may come soon. fications of this approach. As proposals for additional GSEs

With a single case, it is difficult to specify when such
are considered, it would be wise to consider the consequences

"feedback loops" might arise. Certainly, some government

of creating independent political actors with potential influagencies influence the political actors that ostensibly are ence greater than most institutions, public or private.
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Notes
1. Interviews were conducted in the spring of 1996 and the sum-

9. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 required

mer of 1997. Interview subjects included representatives of

the Treasury Department and the Congressional Budget

organizations that participated in the development of the leg-

Office to prepare additional reports on GSE regulation and

islation, including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Treasury

required congressional consideration of GSE legislation by

Department, the Department of Housing and Urban Devel-

September 1991. Failure to consider legislation would re-

opment, the Office of Management and Budget, nonprofit

sult in a mandatory vote on a proposal to be presented by
the Treasury Department.

and industry interest groups, and committee staff from the
relevant committees and subcommittees on both the House

10. HUD's limited regulatory authority over Fannie Mae and

and Senate sides of Congress. Interviews were conducted on

Freddie Mac had rarely been utilized due to chronic lack of

background and subjects declined to be cited by name.

resources, expertise, and political leverage. In 1989, the

2. Home loans are frequently financed with the assistance of
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, or institutions that rely upon the

FIRREA legislation added oversight of Freddie Mac to

Federal Home Loan Bank System. Farm purchases are often

regulations for the GSEs. By the time that regulation of

HUD's responsibilities and required the issuance of new

financed through Farm Credit Banks, Banks for Cooperatives,

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was being restructured, no

or the Federal Agriculture Mortgage Corporation (Farmer

final regulations had been issued.

Mac). Student loans are frequently purchased by the Student 11. While using the term repeatedly, this paper does not take on

Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae), recently "priva-

the vexing issues of "power" described by March (1966),

tized," and college facilities construction can be financed with

Dahl (1957), and others. A simplistic definition-the abil-

the assistance of the College Construction Loan Corporation

ity to get what one wants-is utilized for the analysis of this

(Connie Lee). Securities issued by these GSEs are present in
the portfolios of most investment funds and savings institu12.
tions. In addition to these federal institutions, there are numerous similarly structured state and local entities involved
in housing, transportation, environmental protection, utility

case. Further specification is clearly required.

provision, and other public functions.

The disagreement revealed differences between the two com-

panies. At the time the FHEFSSA was under consideration,
Freddie Mac had been a private company for only two years.
Prior to the introduction of stock ownership and creation of

a board of directors, Freddie Mac, in the words of an ad-

3. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securities are also considered
governmental with respect to restrictions on investment of

ministration official, functioned "like an agency not a private corporation." The leadership at Freddie Mac did not
have the political experience or perspicacity that Fannie Mae

public funds.

4. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was created in 1932
to lend money at 3 percent interest in an effort to revive the
economy. Congress appropriated $300 million to the agency.
It also issued debt and bonds to raise money (Fish 1979, 195).

With the transformation from government agency to private

loans insured by the Department of Veterans Affairs.
6. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac sometimes purchase their own
securities and retain them in their own portfolios.

7. Not all home loans are eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac. There is a ceiling on the dollar value of
loans they can purchase, plus standards which all loans must
meet for purchase. Loans that meet these requirements are
called conforming loans. There is a significant secondary
purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
8. Section 1004 of FIRREA, the 1989 law that overhauled regu-

lation of the savings and loan industry, required the comptroller general of the United States to prepare a study of gov-

ernment-sponsored enterprises, including Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, to determine the financial soundness and stability of the government-sponsored enterprises; the need to
minimize any potential financial exposure of the federal gov-

ernment; and the need to minimize any potential impact on
borrowing of the federal government.

aide to Vice President Mondale and a successful Wall Street
investment banker.

5. In this article, loans described as FHA-insured also include

market for nonconforming loans, that is loans that cannot be

strategists displayed. The contrast between Leland Brendsel,
Freddie Mac's CEO, and Jim Johnson, Fannie Mae's leader,
is telling. Brendsel is a Ph.D. economist. Johnson was a top

corporation, Freddie Mac moved to the profitability node
of the triangle-but had not yet adapted. As a congressional
aide put it, "Freddie Mac was operating under an organizational culture reflecting past interests." Fannie Mae, on the
other hand, recognized the virtue of keeping authority within

HUD, a government agency that, like many interest groups
called upon to support the GSEs' positions, relied on partnerships with Fannie Mae.

13. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had strategic reasons to press
for ambiguous language in the FHEFSSA. For example, one
version of the risk-based capital rules required the regulator
to identify the worst historical interest rate shocks for use in

the stress test. The GSEs resisted this clear requirement and
insisted that the final bill require only that the interest rate
portion of the stress test be "reasonably related" to the worst

historical experience. This left the door open for future dis-

pute (and negotiation) with OFHEO. The frequent appearances of the phrase "reasonably related" suggests the ap-

peal of this solution for the GSEs. Fannie Mae was able to
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the approach favored by Fannie and Freddie by a variety of

extract such concessions because the Bush administration
and several senators were eager to pass the law and feared

activist consumer groups which without notification to Con-

the ability of the GSEs to, at the very least, delay its pas-

gress became recipients of substantial contributions from

sage. By creating mechanisms to exert pressure on their regulators through Congress, the GSEs maintained the value of
their good relations on Capitol Hill.

the two GSEs" (U.S. House 1991 a, 1 2).
16. As one Treasury staffer who worked on the legislation re-

called, "Fannie would make a phone call and all of a sudden

14. The unanswered questions of the capital standards affect
millions of dollars for each GSE. Even seemingly simple

issues can be vexing. For example, the risk-based capital
standard required by Congress calls for a stress test. A com-

fifty letters would arrive on the Hill. And the letters all pretty

much looked the same because Fannie would draft it and
send it out."

17. In a remarkable letter to their colleagues, Representatives

puter simulation is utilized to determine how much capital

J.J. Pickle and Willis Gradison, who had begun the drive

the GSEs require to withstand a horrendous economic sce-

toward FHEFSSA by inserting the report requirement into

nario as bad as the worst 10-year period experienced in any

the savings and loan bill, urged that Fannie Mae's influence

region of the United States. This simplified clause gives some

be resisted: "We believe that Fannie Mae should not pos-

sense of the difficulty of the task. What is a region? The

sess a veto over the form of its own supervision. The pri-

legislation says only that a region is 10 contiguous states.

mary concern of Congress in drafting this legislation should

Which 10 states? This question is critically important; it

be to protect the taxpayer by requiring all GSEs to be capi-

defines how bad the worst-case scenario is for the GSEs.

talized adequately. Public policy on such a serious issue

Development of the capital standards requires the regulator

should not be stalled, perhaps permanently, by lobbying ef-

to resolve scores of such difficult questions.

forts that put the private interest of a single enterprise above

15. In his dissenting views on H.R. 2900, reported out of the

the broader public interest" (Pickle and Gradison 1992).

House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,

They concluded emphatically that "The time has come to

Rep. Jim Leach expressed his dismay over this phenom-

protect the public purse not Fannie Mae's profits" (Pickle

enon: "The committee's judgment on the housing provisions

and Gradison 1992).

of the bill unfortunately was clouded by the endorsement of
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Figure 1 How Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Work
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